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Abstract
Deductibles in health insurance are often regarded as a means to contain health
care costs when individuals exhibit moral hazard. However, in the absence of moral
hazard, voluntarily chosen deductibles may instead lead to self-selection into diﬀer-
ent insurance contracts. We use a set of new variables in the German Socioeconomic
Panel for the years 2002, 2004, and 2006 that measure individual health more ac-
curately and include risk-attitudes towards health in order to determine the price
elasticity of demand for health care. A latent class approach that takes into account
the panel structure of the data reveals that the eﬀect of deductibles on the number
of doctor visits is negligible. Private add-on insurance increases the number of doc-
tor visits. However, altogether the eﬀects of the insurance state on the demand for
doctor visits are small in magnitude.
JEL Classiﬁcation: I11, I18, G22
Keywords: health insurance, deductibles, add-on insurance, count data, latent
class panel model
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11 Introduction
Increasing health care expenditures have been an issue for several decades in most indus-
trialised countries. While demographic change and technological progress can be seen as
the main driving forces behind the increase, both factors can hardly be tackled in order
to contain costs. Moreover, they might lead to even higher expenditures in the future. In
order to lower costs, it seems more promising to detect and to reduce ineﬃciencies in the
health care sector.
One ineﬃciency from the demand side is the problem of moral hazard induced by in-
surance, deﬁned as "the change in health behavior and health care consumption caused
by insurance" (Zweifel and Manning, 2000). This excess demand for (supposedly trivial)
health services could be suppressed via cost-sharing, e.g., deductibles or co-payments for
doctor or hospital visits. However, the optimal amount of cost-sharing is a priori unclear.
In a world with risk-averse individuals and without moral hazard, full cover insurance
(i.e., no deductibles) is a ﬁrst-best solution. Less than full cover insurance (e.g., with
optional deductibles) could instead lead to adverse selection. Yet, when moral hazard is
present, the ﬁrst-best solution is no longer feasible and the introduction of mandatory
deductibles can lead to a second-best solution (see Breyer et al., 2004). Hence, ﬁnding
out the price elasticity of demand for health services (i.e., the amount of moral hazard)
is an important empirical task in order to design an optimal health insurance system.
There are several studies that analyse the impact of the state of insurance on the number
of doctor visits or hospitalisations with German data, e.g., Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995),
Geil et al. (1997), and Riphahn et al. (2002). They compare the behaviour of individuals
covered by private health insurance with those covered by public insurance. In the German
system, the former can choose between having a deductible or not whereas there are
basically no deductibles for the latter.1 The results are mixed. Pohlmeier and Ulrich
(1995) ﬁnd that the probability of visiting a general practitioner (GP) is higher for the
publicly insured, that is, implicitly, for those with more insurance cover. Geil et al. (1997)
show that, for females, being covered by public insurance has a positive (but moderate)
eﬀect on the number of hospitalisations, while no signiﬁcant eﬀect was found for males.
Finally, Riphahn et al., (2002) ﬁnd that private add-on insurance raises the number of
hospitalisations of males while other variables that indicate the insurance state are not
signiﬁcant.
By exploiting the panel structure of the data, Riphahn et al. (2002) and Geil et al.
(1997) account for unobserved individual eﬀects that aﬀect doctor visits, such as individ-
ual frailty, using a random eﬀects model. However, none of the mentioned studies account
1A brief introduction to the German health insurance system will be given in chapter 2.
1for potential endogeneity problems that come with the insurance choice. That is, ﬁnding
positive eﬀects of full cover insurance on the demand for doctor visits should not neces-
sarily be interpreted as a causal eﬀect and, thus, not as moral hazard. When making a
decision about the insurance plan, the individual takes into account her expected demand
for health services in the future. A person who knows that she needs many visits to the
doctor in the future might not buy private insurance with deductibles. Instead, she would
prefer either private insurance without a deductible or even public insurance. Thus, the
health status both aﬀects the demand for doctor visits and the insurance type and an
incompletely observed health status by the researcher might lead to biased results. An-
other problem are unobserved preferences like risk-aversion. Risk-averse individuals tend
to demand more doctor visits and at the same time prefer full cover insurance.
Altogether, because there are no experimental data available for Germany (as, e.g.,
the well known RAND health insurance experiment) and deductibles are in general not
mandatory but can be chosen optionally, ﬁnding positive eﬀects of public insurance on
the number of doctor visits (or hospital stays) might merely reﬂect a selection eﬀect. One
way to deal with the endogeneity problem is an instrumental variable approach (see, e.g.,
Windmeijer and Santos Silva, 1997 and Schellhorn, 2001, for an application with Swiss
data), although, in practice, it is hard to ﬁnd good instruments, i.e. instruments which
are valid and not weak.
This paper addresses possible endogeneity as an omitted variable bias problem and uses
better information on the health status of individuals than is normally available in survey
data and direct measures of individual risk-aversion. Using these additional pieces of
information, the tests performed cannot reject the hypothesis that the insurance state is
exogenous. In order to account for unobserved heterogeneity (which remains important
even after inclusion of the newly available information on health status and risk-aversion),
this paper follows the approach of Bago d’Uva (2006) who uses a latent class hurdle model
for panel count data.
It turns out that while the insured with deductibles have less doctor visits than the insured
without deductibles, no causal eﬀect of the deductible itself can be found. This leads to
the conclusion that self-selection instead accounts for the lower number of doctor visits
of the insured with deductibles. The positive eﬀect of add-on insurance on the number of
doctor visits, however, can be found even after accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short introduction into the German
health insurance system. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical strategy, while
section 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
22 Institutional Background
The German health insurance system consists of two parts. Roughly 88 per cent of the
population are insured by public health insurance (also called the statutory health in-
surance, SHI). It is statutory for all individuals with earnings below a certain income
threshold (3,975 Euro per month in 2007) and ﬁnanced by payroll taxes. Therefore, it is
independent of age, gender, or health status of the insured. Since 1997, the publicly in-
sured are allowed to choose between diﬀerent insurance companies yet the beneﬁt package
is heavily regulated and does not vary much between companies.2 The insurance com-
panies are not allowed to reject applicants and non-working family members are covered
without an extra premium. Until the most recent reform which took eﬀect in April 2007,
there were basically no (optional) deductibles in the public scheme. However, in 2004,
a co-payment of 10 Euro for the ﬁrst visit in a quarter was introduced.3 Furthermore,
there were low co-payments for hospitalisations (10 Euro per calendar day up to a max-
imum of 28 days) and for prescription drugs (Winkelmann, 2004). As of April 2007, the
insured can choose between diﬀerent contracts which include contracts with and without
deductibles. The publicly insured can additionally purchase private add-on insurance that
either increases quality (e.g. double rooms in hospitals) or covers co-payments on denture
or glasses.
Individuals who earn more than the income threshold, the self-employed, and civil servants
are allowed to opt out of the public insurance system and instead buy private insurance
(which accounts for the remaining 12 per cent of the German population, abstracting from
a small group without any insurance coverage). They are usually called the “voluntarily
insured”. The private insurance premium does not depend on income but is instead a risk-
equivalent contribution (depending on age, gender, and health status). Private insurance
companies can reject bad risks. Furthermore, privately insured individuals have to pay
higher premia in order to cover non-working family members. Thus, being a bad risk or
having dependents might be two of the reasons for staying voluntarily in the public system
for about 50 per cent of all the individuals who are allowed to opt out although private
insurance often is perceived to lead to higher quality of health care. Private insurance
companies usually oﬀer a set of diﬀerent contracts, including the choice of deductibles.
As opposed to the public insurance scheme, the privately insured ﬁrst have to pay the
costs they incur and then get reimbursed at the end of the year. The insured who do
not send in claims get a reimbursement of a part of their insurance premium. Individuals
2About 95 per cent of the package that all insurers have to provide is stated in Social Code Book V
(see Buchner and Wasem, 2003).
3See Augurzky et al. (2006) for an evaluation of this reform. The authors do not ﬁnd reductions in
the number of doctor visits due to the reform and conclude that 10 Euro is too low to lead to signiﬁcant
eﬀects.
3who opt out of the public insurance system are in general not allowed to re-enter later
as long as they do not fall below the income threshold. Furthermore, contracts with a
deductible cannot be transformed into full cover contracts without proof of good health.
Hence, the decision to buy private insurance and about the deductible are practically
lifetime decisions.
Regarding incentive schemes faced by the insured, four groups can be compared. The
privately insured with a deductible can be expected to have the strongest incentive to
contain costs, followed by the privately insured without deductibles. The publicly insured
without add-on insurance might have a lower incentive to contain costs than privately
insured but a higher one than those who purchase add-on insurance.
3 Empirical Model
3.1 Data and Variable Description
The database for the empirical analysis is the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP),
which started in 1984 in West Germany and was extended to include East Germany in
June 1990. There were several refreshments resulting in a sample size of more than 20,000
adult individuals living in more than 12,000 households that participated in the GSOEP
survey in 2006 (see, e.g., Wagner et al., 2007). The GSOEP includes questions about
the number of doctor visits within the last three months prior to the interview and the
number of hospital trips in the previous year. Due to the generally low price elasticity of
hospital trips, we focus on the number of doctor visits to detect moral hazard.4
The number of doctor visits depends, to a large extent, on the health status of the
individual. However, direct measurement of the health status is somewhat complicated
and, especially in general surveys such as the GSOEP, often restricted to the self-assessed
health status (SAH, on a 5-point scale from very good to bad). As often argued, this
measure is prone to measurement error and reporting bias, possibly leading to biased
coeﬃcient estimates (see, e.g., Bound, 1991 or Crossley and Kennedy, 2002). Furthermore,
it is unlikely that a complete picture of individual health is captured by the SAH. Two
newly available and more objective measures are used here to alleviate this problem: the
Physical Component Summary Scale (PCS), a measure of physical health, and the Mental
Component Summary Scale (MCS) a measure of mental health (see Nübling et al., 2007
4The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v2.0 (Nov 2007)
for Stata. PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu).
The PanelWhiz generated DO ﬁle to retrieve the SOEP data used here and any Panelwhiz Plugins are
available upon request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are my own. Haisken-DeNew and
Hahn (2006) describe PanelWhiz in detail.
4for a description). These measures are based on the SF12-questionnaire in the GSOEP
that includes several questions about health quality and satisfaction of the individuals.5
Both variables are calculated using explorative factor analysis and lie between 0 and 100,
with a higher value indicating a better health status. The mean value of the GSOEP 2004
population is 50 points with a standard deviation of 10 points. Although both measures
are also based on self-reported information, they give a much more detailed picture of the
true health status.
As an objective measure of individual health we use the body mass index (BMI) and
the number of hospital stays in the previous year. The three variables PCS, MCS, and
BMI are only available in the waves 2002, 2004, and 2006, hence, these three waves of
the GSOEP are used for the analysis. It turns out that after controlling for these health
measures, the self assessed health status still contains information to explain the number
of doctor visits and should therefore not be left out.
One further variable that is newly available in the GSOEP is a self-assessed attitude
towards risk concerning health matters on an 11-point scale from 0 (very risk-averse) to
10 (not at all risk-averse).6 The risk-attitude can be expected to have an important impact
on the demand for health care. It was only asked in 2004. However, it seems reasonable
to assume that this preference did not change in the span of ﬁve years. Although the
attitude towards risks are self-assessed, Dohmen et al. (2005) show in an experimental
setting with a subgroup of the GSOEP households that it is reliable. Another variable
that reﬂects preferences of the individual is the assessment about worries concerning the
own health (on a 3-point scale between 1= very concerned and 3= not at all concerned).
It is on the one hand informative about the health status, on the other hand, conditional
on the health status, it captures a part of the individual doctor visiting behaviour.
Using these new variables (together with a set of other socio economic variables which
are not the focus of this study), we can control for a lot of important heterogeneity that
has an eﬀect on the number of doctor visits and the insurance state at the same time and
which remained unobserved in previous studies.
Only the privately insured can have contracts with deductibles. In our dataset the infor-
mation on deductibles of the privately insured is restricted to a binary variable indicating
the existence or absence of a deductible. Although the publicly insured can indicate what
kind of private add-on insurance they hold, we collapse these into a binary variable in-
dicating whether or not an individual holds some kind of add-on insurance due to the
low coverage of the publicly insured with add-on insurance (only about 14 per cent of all
5Questions concern, among others, bodily pain, stress, ability to carry out everyday tasks, phases of
melancholy, etc. Using all the 12 variables as regressors instead of the two combined measures did not
improve the estimations.
6The question in the GSOEP is: “How would you rate your willingness to take risks with your health?”
5publicly insured hold some kind of private add-on insurance). However, add-on insurance
that cover hospital stays or medical costs abroad are not included here. More precisely,
the binary variable Add-on states whether an individual holds supplementary insurance
that covers dentures, corrective devices, some kinds of therapeutic measures, or others.
We restrict the sample of individuals to those older than 25 years7 and also exclude civil
servants due to their special insurance status. In general, the employer of a civil servant
covers 50 per cent (or more) of the health care costs while civil servants have to insure
only the remaining 50 per cent (either privately or publicly). Treating a civil servant with
private insurance and deductible similar to other privately insured would certainly bias
the results. All together, we use information from 18,024 individuals leading to 46,440
observations in person-year form after exclusion of observations with missing values in
any of the variables used for the regression analysis.
Table 1: Doctor Visits of Subgroups
Average Probability Average Number
# of sd of one sd # of visits sd of
visits visit if > 0 obs.
Whole Sample 2,53 4,05 0,69 0,46 3,64 4,42 46440
Public Insurance 2,56 4,02 0,70 0,46 3,64 4,36 41345
– voluntary 2,03 3,48 0,64 0,48 3,16 3,91 4540
– with add-on 2,61 4,28 0,71 0,45 3,66 4,67 3311
– volunt. with add-on 2,28 4,00 0,71 0,46 3,22 4,43 645
Private Insurance 2,26 4,27 0,62 0,48 3,63 4,93 5079
– with deductible 1,97 3,85 0,58 0,49 3,38 4,54 2818
– without deductible 2,62 4,72 0,67 0,47 3,91 5,31 2261
Source: GSOEP, pooled years 2002, 2004, 2006; individuals older than 25, no civil servants.
The number of doctor visits in the previous three months of several groups with diﬀerent
insurance states in the pooled sample is given in Table 1. The overall mean is 2.53, with
31 per cent of all the individuals having no doctor visit at all. Conditional on having
at least one visit, the average number of doctor visits in the whole sample is 3.64. The
group of publicly insured has a higher number of doctor visits than the group of privately
insured (2.56 vs. 2.26). However, both groups are hardly comparable because, ﬁrst of
all, the group of privately insured consists of individuals with higher income and better
education - characteristics that are known to be correlated with better health (see table
4 in the appendix for means of the covariates for diﬀerent subgroups). Furthermore, this
group has the better risk-pool because bad risks are either rejected by private health
7This excludes individuals who are either covered by their parents’ insurance.
6insurance companies or would have to pay high contributions that preclude them from
buying private health insurance. The groups of voluntarily publicly insured and privately
insured are more suitable for comparison. Although the ﬁrst group can be expected to
have the worse risk-pool (due to the abovementioned reasons), it exhibits a lower number
of doctor visits. This comes as a surprise and might point to physician-induced demand.8
The comparison of the privately insured with and without deductible shows a clear picture:
the privately insured with a deductible have much less doctor visits (1.97 vs. 2.62), a lower
probability of visiting a doctor (58 per cent vs. 67 per cent), and even fewer doctor visits
conditional on having at least one visit (3.38 vs. 3.91). Likewise, individuals with add-
on insurance exhibit slightly higher numbers of doctor visits. However, these are only
unconditional numbers which do not account for diﬀerent health statuses across groups
or diﬀerent attitudes towards visiting a doctor. That is, in order to establish causation,
a more detailed analysis that controls for important observable and unobservable factors
is necessary.
3.2 Hurdle Model and Endogeneity of the Insurance Choice
It is often argued that the observed number of doctor visits is a result of two diﬀerent
(and probably independent) decision-making processes. First, the patient decides whether
or not to see a doctor in case of an illness. Once a doctor is seen, however, the doctor
determines the length of the treatment. Hence, a hurdle model seems to be the most
appropriate formulation in order to explain the number of doctor visits (Mullahy, 1986;
Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995). Let
g(yit) =
(
f1(0|xit) if yit = 0
(1 − f1(0|xit))f2(yit|xit,yit > 0) if yit > 0
(1)
where f2(yit|xit,yit > 0) = f2(yit|xit)[1 − f2(0|xit)]−1, yit is the number of doctor visits of
individual i at time t, and xit is a vector of covariates. f1(0|xit) = P(yit = 0|xit) is a binary
function that determines the probability of having no doctor visit at all in a given period.
Given that the number of doctor visits exceeds zero (with probability 1 − f1(0|xit)), a
truncated-at-zero function f2(yit|xit,yit > 0) determines the exact number of visits.
When analysing the impact of health insurance on the demand for health care services,
there is possibly an endogeneity problem. This mainly stems from omitted variable bias
in two cases. First, due to the risk-equivalised insurance premia of private insurance
8Physicians can charge treatments of privately insured at least 2.3 times higher than of publicly
insured, which clearly gives them an incentive to focus more on privately insured. See Jürges, 2007, for
a recent analysis of supplier-induced demand with data from the GSOEP.
7companies, individuals with better health tend to buy private insurance (and a deductible)
and have less doctor visits at the same time. In survey data, however, the health status is
typically poorly observed. Thus, a lot of information about the true health status remains
unobserved, which probably leads to biased estimates. The second source of endogeneity
might be preferences like risk-aversion that, on one hand, aﬀect the number of doctor
visits (risk-averse are likely to have more doctor visits given a ﬁxed health status) and,
on the other hand, the insurance state (risk-averse tend to buy full cover insurance).
However, including the new set of health and risk variables might reduce the endogeneity
problem.
Given the economic interpretation of the hurdle model, one can argue that possible endo-
geneity of the insurance choice should mainly play a role in the ﬁrst stage, namely when
the patient has full control. Thus, to determine the degree of endogeneity, we ﬁrst focus
on that stage and model the decision to see a doctor together with the decision about a
certain insurance contract. Consider the following bivariate model
y1 = 1[x1β1 + hδ1 + α1y2 + µ1 > 0] (2)
y2 = 1[x2β2 + hδ2 + µ2 > 0] (3)
where y1 is the binary decision to see a doctor and y2 the binary decision about the
insurance contract (e.g. deductible yes/no, or add-on insurance yes/no), h is the observed
health status, and x1 and x2 are socio-economic variables like age, education, and income.
Finally, µ1 and µ2 capture unobserved eﬀects like unobserved health and preferences
towards visiting a doctor. We assume that the number of doctor visits in one period
depends on the insurance status whereas the insurance status does not depend on the
number of doctor visits in that same period (given a certain health status). The correlation
between µ1 and µ2, ρ = corr(µ1,µ2), does not equal 0 if the unobserved eﬀects that aﬀect
the number of doctor visits and the insurance choice are correlated. Assuming a bivariate
normal distribution of the error terms, the parameters of this model (and the correlation
ρ can be estimated by a bivariate probit.
We ﬁt two diﬀerent regressions, one where the insurance variable is deductible and one
where it is add-on. As discussed in chapter 2, only the voluntarily insured can opt for
an insurance with a deductible. The private add-on insurance, on the other hand, is
only interesting for the publicly insured. Hence, we only include the voluntarily insured
(precisely, these are the voluntary publicly insured together with the privately insured)
in the ﬁrst regression and the publicly insured in the second one.
In the ﬁrst regression, ρ can be expected to be negative if the insured who expect to
have fewer doctor visits in the future (for unobserved reasons) tend to buy insurance
8with a deductible. In the group of publicly insured, the insurance-state variable is add-
on insurance. Unlike in the deductible case, add-on insurance leads to more insurance
coverage, hence, a positive ρ can be expected.
Although the nonlinear model is identiﬁed by functional form, we add variables to x2
that are assumed to have no inﬂuence on the decision to visit a doctor and are thus
excluded from x1. These are risk-aversion concerning ﬁnancial matters and the general
attitude towards co-payments for health care services.9 The bivariate probit model allows
for endogeneity of the insurance choice in the doctor-visits equation via correlation of
the error terms. However, as table 2 shows, in neither of the two cases is the estimated
correlation coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. We follow (Knapp and Seaks, 1998)
in using a t-test on the correlation coeﬃcient as a test for endogeneity of the dummy
regressors. Here, the hypothesis of ρ = 0 (no endogeneity) cannot be rejected in either
case.
Table 2: Estimated correlation in bivariate probit
Equation ˆ ρ ˆ se(ˆ ρ) Observations
Deductible 0.050 (0.18) 9246
Add-on -0.053 (0.11) 39698
Estimations done by Stata program biprobit, standard errors clustered by individuals. Full estimation
results in the appendix, see table 5.
In both equations even the sign is diﬀerent from what is expected, however, the values are
very close to zero. The set of new variables is highly jointly signiﬁcant in the doctor-visits
equation in both cases. It is furthermore jointly signiﬁcant in the insurance-equations
(only at the 10%-level in the add-on-equation; test-statistics not reported here). Thus, it
can be argued that capturing information from the new health variables and the degree
of risk-aversion (plus health worries) reduces the endogeneity problem by a substantial
amount. But one can think of even more reasons originating in the insurance system
that make it possible for endogeneity to be less of a problem than possibly expected. As
discussed in chapter 2, opting out of private insurance and deciding on deductibles are
practically lifetime decisions. While the (partly unobserved) health status should have a
high impact on the decision about health insurance in a given year, it only aﬀects the num-
ber of doctor visits in the following years but not the decision about the insurance state
(at least as far as private insurance and deductibles are concerned). Moreover, Grabka
(2006) gives another important reason for the privately insured to choose a contract with
a deductible that is independent of changes in the health status of the insured. Unlike in
9Risk-aversion concerning ﬁnancial matters is asked in the same way as the risk-aversion concerning
health. The question about the attitudes towards co-payments was asked only in 2002. As in the case of
risk-aversion, we assume that this is a time-invariant preference.
9the case of public insurance, cost containment and the stability of contribution rates have
not been a big issue in the past decades in the private insurance system. This has led to a
much higher proportional increase in costs than in the public sector and, thus, in steadily
increasing contribution rates for the privately insured. One way for an insured to stop
an increase in the contribution rate in a given year is to transform a contract without a
deductible into one with a deductible to keep the basic insurance premium stable. In this
case, the decision about buying insurance with a deductible is not aﬀected by a change
in the health status but by other reasons.
In the next section we leave aside endogeneity concerns and turn back to the hurdle model.
3.3 Latent Class Hurdle Model
Given that the dependent variable (number of doctor visits in the previous three months)
is an integer, it is appropriate to use a count data model in order to specify the two
underlying functions in the hurdle model. While the Poisson model is a good starting
point for count data, it is often seen to be too restrictive due to its assumption of the
equality of mean and variance of the dependent variable, which is clearly not the case here
(see table 1). In order to allow for over-dispersion, it is common to introduce a gamma-
distributed error term, ending up with the negative binomial distribution (“negbin”; see,














itβ) and α is the over-dispersion parameter.
Combining the negative binomial distribution with the hurdle structure in (1), f1 becomes
f1(0|xit) = P(yit = 0|xit,β1) = (µ1 + 1)
−1 (6)
where µ1 =exp(x0
itβ1).10 The truncated part in (1) becomes
f2(yit|xit,β2;yit > 0) =
Γ(α−1 + yit)








While the xit’s capture a lot of observable heterogeneity between individuals across time
(especially the health status, insurance status, age, sex, and education), there might
10Here, α is set to one because it would not be identiﬁed from β1 in this binary information case (see
Bago d’Uva, 2006)
10still be great a deal of unobservable heterogeneity left. This could be general unmeasured
frailty or preferences towards visiting a doctor. These factors clearly aﬀect the demand for
health care and can be considered time-invariant. In order to account for this unobserved
heterogeneity, we use the latent class hurdle model derived by Bago d’Uva (2006) for
panel count data in which the time-invariant individual eﬀect follows an arbitrary discrete
distribution that takes on a small number of masspoints. The latent class hurdle model
combines the basic hurdle model (that groups individuals into “users” and “non-users”)
with a ﬁnite mixture model (where the latent classes can be given interpretations such as
“high users” and “low users” (Deb and Trivedi, 2002)).
As in Clark and Etile (2006), the individual probability of belonging to one of C latent







,j = 1,...,C (8)
This ensures that 0 < πij < 1 and
PC
j=1 πij = 1. In order to guarantee that each
individual belongs to the same latent class over all time periods, we choose the zi as time-
invariant characteristics. We follow Bago d’Uva (2005) in using the individual averages
of the xit, deﬁning zi = ¯ xi. Note that this speciﬁcation allows for correlation between the
observable characteristics and the unobserved individual heterogeneity (that is, here, the
latent class).










where θj = (β1j,β2j,αj) and equation (1), (5), (6), and (7) are plugged into equation (8).
The most ﬂexible formulation allows for diﬀerent slope parameters in every latent class
(β1j 6= β1k and β2j 6= β2k for j 6= k) and diﬀerent parameters in the two hurdle parts
(β1j 6= β2j). That is, belonging to a certain latent class does not only alter the intercept
but is allowed to aﬀect each slope parameter. This, however, requires estimation of many
parameters. For instance, a fully ﬂexible hurdle model with three latent classes and, say,
20 regressors and a constant would include 171 coeﬃcients11 that have to be estimated.
This ﬂexible speciﬁcation is very data-demanding. Because we only have three waves
and, furthermore, carry out diﬀerent regressions for publicly and voluntarily insured, we
restrict the model to the same slope parameters across latent classes and allow only for
intercept heterogeneity. This still requires estimation of 91 diﬀerent parameters in the
11These are three classes times two sets of parameters for the ﬁrst and second hurdle part times 21
parameters (incl. constant) plus three diﬀerent over-dispersion parameters plus two times 21 parameters
for the probability of belonging to a certain latent class.
11above example.12 Thus, the use of a ﬁnite mixture model is motivated from a statistical
point of view in this case, namely the possibility to introduce a random-eﬀect without
imposing too strong distributional assumptions, instead of trying to ﬁnd diﬀerent eﬀects
of observable variables for diﬀerent latent classes. The likelihood function is maximized
with respect to the vectors θ1,...,θC,γ1,...,γC−1 using the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-
Shanno quasi-Newton algorithm.13 Note, ﬁnally, that in this speciﬁcation, the two parts
of the hurdle model are not assumed to be independent. This restrictive assumption is
relaxed due to the latent class speciﬁcation.
4 Estimation Results
The latent class panel model captures unobserved individual eﬀects. Based on the Akaike
criterion (AIC), it outperforms a standard hurdle model with a logit as the ﬁrst part
and a truncated negbin as a second part (results not shown here). As with the bivariate
probit, we carry out separate regressions for both groups of insured (public and voluntary
insurance). According to the AIC, models with four latent classes dominate models with
two respectively three classes in both cases.14 Due to the nonlinearity of the model, the
interpretation of the estimated parameters is somewhat diﬃcult. Here we focus on the
calculated marginal eﬀects of the most interesting variables in order to interpret the results
(table 3). The full regression results can be found in tables 6, 7, and 8 in the appendix.
Before turning to the coeﬃcients related to the insurance state, we brieﬂy summarize the
eﬀects of other important variables, particularly the newly available variables. All three
variables indicating the health status show a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on the demand for
health care. Both higher PCS and higher MCS (indicating a healthier individual) lead to
less doctor visits, where the eﬀect of physical health is stronger than the one of mental
health. However, even after controlling for both more comprehensive health measures,
most of the dummy variables indicating self-assessed general health status remain signif-
icant. A step from one category to a better one increases the expected number of doctor
visits, everything else being constant. Most of the variables are highly signiﬁcant in both
stages and, thus, turn out to have the most important impact on the demand for health
services.
122×(20+3)+1+2×21 =91. It turned out, that even allowing for diﬀerent over-dispersion parameters
lead to problems with maximising the likelihood function. Restricting the over-dispersion to one pa-
rameter made the maximisation much more feasible. Furthermore, to increase the degrees of freedom,
we implicitly assume that males and females diﬀer only by a constant term. However, ﬁtting diﬀerent
regressions for males and females did not lead to diﬀerent results concerning the insurance state variables
in earlier versions of the paper.
13We used the ml command in Stata and drawed heavily on the code provided in Jones et al. (2006,
ch. 11). Diﬀerent starting values were used to rule out local maxima of the likelihood function.
14A model with ﬁve latent classes did not converge in either case.
12Table 3: Marginal eﬀects in latent class hurdle model
Voluntary Insured Publicly Insured
P(Y > 0|X) E[Y |Y > 0,X] P(Y > 0|X) E[Y |Y > 0,X]
Deductible 0.007 0.016 -0.037 0.096
Private -0.032 0.020 -0.097 0.103
Addon 0.030** 0.010 0.185** 0.074
PCS -0.007*** 0.001 -0.050*** 0.006 -0.007*** 0.001 -0.061*** 0.003
MCS -0.003*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.004 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.026*** 0.002
Risk attitude health 0.001 0.003 -0.051*** 0.017 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.013
Worries Health -0.040*** 0.011 -0.116 0.067 -0.036*** 0.005 -0.322*** 0.031
SAH very good -0.010 0.027 -0.560*** 0.130 -0.079*** 0.014 -0.526*** 0.079
SAH good 0.001 0.015 -0.265*** 0.091 -0.042*** 0.007 -0.272*** 0.045
SAH bad or poor 0.065*** 0.023 0.394*** 0.129 0.037*** 0.011 0.286*** 0.051
BMI high 0.005 0.014 0.049 0.085 -0.001 0.007 0.004 0.045
BMI very high 0.073*** 0.021 0.276 0.146 -0.004 0.010 -0.032 0.062
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Marginal eﬀects of continuous
variables are calculated numerically, all marginal eﬀects evaluated at sample means.
The body-mass index dummies are not signiﬁcant (except for BMI very high in the ﬁrst
stage in the group of the publicly insured). It can be argued that the eﬀect of the BMI is
already well captured by the previously discussed measures. The self-assessed risk attitude
towards health matters has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the number of doctor visits in only
in the second stage in group of publicly insured. As could be expected, more risk-averse
individuals (with a lower value of risk-aversion on the 11-point scale) have a higher number
of doctor visits.15 Finally, worries about the own health are associated with more doctor
visits. Being very concerned about the own health especially inﬂuences the decision to
see a doctor in the ﬁrst stage. Thus, this variable captures not only more information
about the true health status but also behavioural diﬀerences between individuals.
The insurance status variables also show a clear picture. Holding add-on insurance raises
the probability of visiting a doctor (the probability of visiting a doctor is 3%-points higher
for an individual with add-on insurance than for one without). The marginal eﬀect of
deductible is about zero. Holding private insurance decreases the probability of doctor
visits, however, it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.16 Thus, it can be concluded
that only add-on insurance holders show the expected incentive eﬀect. Conditional on
the health status and risk preferences, holding private insurance with a deductible does
not seem to lower the probability of visiting a doctor.
Given that the patient has visited the doctor at least once in the previous three months,
the expected number of doctor visits shows a similar behaviour. The marginal eﬀect
15Without controlling for the health status, the eﬀect of risk-aversion concerning health matters could
be positive, meaning that risk-averse individuals care more for their health and, thus, need less doctor
visits. Controlling for the health status, however, this variable captures the pure eﬀect of risk-aversion
on the decision of visiting a doctor.
16Deductible and Private are also not jointly signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage.
13of Deductible in the second stage is again very small and not statistically signiﬁcant.
Conditional on at least one visit, the expected number of visits in the last three months is
0.037 lower for individuals with a deductible. A similar result holds for private insurance,
although the marginal eﬀect is somewhat higher in absolute terms.
Instead, add-on insurance even increases the number of doctor visits in the second stage
(with a marginal eﬀect of 0.185). This (as well as the results on risk-aversion) shows that
the second stage is not entirely determined by the physician’s behaviour but also by the
patient.
The results indicate the absence of a causal eﬀect of deductibles on the demand for health
care. Hence, the lower number of doctor visits of the insured with a deductible is instead
a sign of self-selection rather than of moral hazard. In contrast, the strong eﬀect of add-on
insurance, even after controlling for health status, observable preferences, and unobserved
heterogeneity, indicates an incentive eﬀect of health care consumers.
5 Conclusion
Finding out the price elasticity of demand for health care is an important empirical task.
A low elasticity (i.e., here, absence of diﬀerent behaviour caused by diﬀerent insurance
contracts) in a world with risk-averse individuals implies an insurance system with full
cover insurance as a best solution. Dealing with moral hazard, however, less than full
cover insurance could help to contain ineﬃciently high demand for health care.
Empirically, one can compare the behaviour of individuals with full cover insurance with
the one of individuals with less than full cover insurance in order to ﬁnd out the elastic-
ity. However, if the choice of deductibles is voluntary (and deductibles are not randomly
assigned), there will be self-selection into diﬀerent insurance schemes. In Germany, the
insured with deductibles have a lower number of doctor visits than insured without de-
ductibles. However, using a set of newly available variables in the GSOEP (especially more
comprehensive health measures and measures of risk-aversion) and a latent class panel
model that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, no causal eﬀect of the deductibles was
found.
The results might be interpreted as absence of moral hazard. However, the highly reg-
ulated German health care system only allows patients to make own decisions in rare
occasions (for instance, whether they want to make a doctor visit or not). Not to ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant eﬀect here does not necessarily mean that individuals do not show moral
hazard behaviour in general. Furthermore, the results do not necessarily imply that de-
ductibles as such are not suitable to contain health care costs in Germany in general.
14First, especially individuals with a high income are allowed to chose a deductible. It is by
all means possible that the price elasticity in this special group is not representative for all
households in the population. The signiﬁcant positive impact of private add-on insurance
on the number of doctor visits is an indication of this point because this insurance type
can be purchased by the whole population. Second, and most important, deductibles
which are not voluntary but mandatory (as, e.g., in the Swiss health system) might have
a strong eﬀect on the demand for health care.
Finally, although the estimated eﬀects for add-on insurance are statistically signiﬁcant,
they are rather small in magnitude, compared to the baseline eﬀect (the diﬀerent constant
for the diﬀerent latent classes) and other eﬀects like health, gender, and socio-economic
characteristics (see the full regression results in table 6). Thus, this study generally
conﬁrms the notion that the German population only responds slowly and weakly on
ﬁnancial incentives given by the health care system.
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17Appendix
Table 4: Sample means by subgroups
SHI SHI Voluntary Voluntary
without add-on with add-on with deductible without deductible
PCS 48.34 50.43 52.22 51.47
MCS 49.74 50.34 51.68 50.49
SAH very good 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.10
SAH good 0.37 0.43 0.47 0.46
SAH bad or poor 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.11
BMI high 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.38
BMI very high 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.12
Hospital Stays t-1 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.12
Degree of Handicap 7.96 5.38 3.5 4.98
Smoker 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.27
Worries Health 2.06 2.20 2.31 2.25
Risk attitude health 2.74 3.16 3.46 3.27
Female 0.54 0.56 0.33 0.36
Age 51.1 47.20 49.52 49.09
Foreign 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.02
Married 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.73
Children under 16 0.30 0.34 0.34 0.34
West Germany 0.72 0.86 0.87 0.85
Full-time employed 0.37 0.50 0.68 0.62
Self-employed 0.03 0.07 0.40 0.20
Blue collar worker 0.18 0.15 0.01 0.05
White collar worker 0.30 0.49 0.34 0.43
Health job 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03
Net-household inc./1000 2.64 3.49 5.19 4.13
Net-labour inc./1000 0.76 1.23 2.38 1.86
Years of schooling 11.6 12.59 14.32 13.85
2002 0.34 0.25 0.31 0.36
2004 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.34
Observations 38034 3311 2818 6801
Source: GSOEP, pooled years 2002, 2004, 2006; individuals older than 25, no civil servants.
18Table 5: Bivariate probit results
Voluntary Insured Public Insured




PCS -0.024*** (0.00) 0.006 (0.00) -0.023*** (0.00) -0.003 (0.00)
MCS -0.007*** (0.00) 0.007** (0.00) -0.005*** (0.00) 0.002 (0.00)
SAH very good -0.198** (0.07) -0.003 (0.07) -0.247*** (0.04) 0.007 (0.05)
SAH good -0.093* (0.04) -0.028 (0.04) -0.124*** (0.02) -0.019 (0.03)
SAH poor or bad 0.162* (0.07) 0.165* (0.07) 0.192*** (0.03) -0.084* (0.04)
BMI high -0.024 (0.03) -0.012 (0.04) 0.026 (0.02) -0.004 (0.03)
BMI very high 0.065 (0.05) -0.056 (0.06) 0.042 (0.02) 0.043 (0.04)
Hospital Stays t-1 0.301*** (0.05) 0.013 (0.03) 0.343*** (0.03) 0.034* (0.01)
Degree Disability 0.008*** (0.00) -0.002 (0.00) 0.006*** (0.00) -0.000 (0.00)
Smoker -0.188*** (0.04) 0.036 (0.04) -0.202*** (0.02) 0.056 (0.03)
Worries health -0.200*** (0.03) -0.002 (0.03) -0.167*** (0.01) 0.022 (0.02)
Risk attitude health -0.013 (0.01) -0.004 (0.01) -0.003 (0.00) 0.008 (0.01)
Female 0.246*** (0.04) -0.010 (0.05) 0.283*** (0.02) 0.147*** (0.03)
Age -0.037*** (0.01) 0.033** (0.01) -0.029*** (0.00) 0.015* (0.01)
Age squared 0.000*** (0.00) -0.000** (0.00) 0.000*** (0.00) -0.000** (0.00)
Foreign -0.092 (0.08) 0.205* (0.09) 0.072* (0.03) -0.445*** (0.06)
Married 0.078 (0.04) -0.161** (0.05) 0.030 (0.02) 0.029 (0.03)
Children under 16 -0.100** (0.04) 0.038 (0.05) -0.068** (0.02) 0.001 (0.03)
West Germany 0.091 (0.05) 0.124* (0.06) -0.081*** (0.02) 0.413*** (0.03)
Full-time employed -0.230*** (0.06) 0.106 (0.07) -0.076** (0.03) 0.054 (0.04)
Self-employed 0.027 (0.08) 0.353*** (0.08) -0.165*** (0.04) 0.204** (0.07)
Blue collar worker -0.041 (0.10) -0.454*** (0.13) -0.104*** (0.03) -0.011 (0.05)
White collar worker 0.229** (0.07) -0.221** (0.08) 0.043 (0.03) 0.140*** (0.04)
Health job -0.336*** (0.08) 0.059 (0.09) -0.184*** (0.05) -0.003 (0.07)
Net household inc./1000 0.007 (0.01) 0.026*** (0.01) 0.005 (0.01) 0.039*** (0.01)
Net labour inc./1000 -0.002 (0.01) -0.014 (0.01) 0.009 (0.01) 0.035 (0.02)
Years of schooling 0.020*** (0.01) 0.009 (0.01) 0.032*** (0.00) 0.035*** (0.01)
2002 0.058 (0.04) -0.126*** (0.03) 0.080*** (0.02) -0.336*** (0.02)
2004 0.012 (0.03) -0.032 (0.02) 0.054** (0.02) -0.240*** (0.02)
Risk attitude ﬁnance 0.024* (0.01) 0.025*** (0.01)
Attitdue cost-sharing -0.173*** (0.02) -0.084*** (0.02)
Constant 2.959*** (0.35) -1.878*** (0.37) 2.370*** (0.16) -2.316*** (0.24)
ρ 0.050 (0.18) -0.053 (0.11)
Log-pseudolikelihood -10574.217 -30738.545
Observations 9246 39698
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses
Estimations done by Stata program biprobit, standard errors clustered by individuals, less observations
than in table 4 because of missing values in the instruments.
19Table 6: Estimation results of latent class hurdle model
Voluntary Insured Publicly Insured
ˆ βstage1 ˆ βstage2 ˆ βstage1 ˆ βstage2
Deductible 0.044 (0.10) -0.021 (0.06)
Private -0.204 (0.13) -0.055 (0.06)
Addon 0.192** (0.07) 0.088** (0.03)
PCS -0.046*** (0.01) -0.029*** (0.00) -0.041*** (0.00) -0.030*** (0.00)
MCS -0.018*** (0.01) -0.018*** (0.00) -0.009*** (0.00) -0.013*** (0.00)
SAH very good -0.063 (0.17) -0.372*** (0.10) -0.470*** (0.08) -0.297*** (0.05)
SAH good 0.002 (0.09) -0.151** (0.05) -0.265*** (0.05) -0.136*** (0.02)
SAH bad or poor 0.427** (0.16) 0.205*** (0.06) 0.239*** (0.07) 0.134*** (0.02)
BMI high 0.034 (0.09) 0.028 (0.05) -0.008 (0.04) 0.002 (0.02)
BMI very high 0.487** (0.15) 0.148* (0.07) -0.028 (0.06) -0.016 (0.03)
Hospital Stays t-1 0.574*** (0.11) 0.174*** (0.03) 0.456*** (0.05) 0.088*** (0.01)
Degree of Handicap 0.015*** (0.00) 0.002* (0.00) 0.007*** (0.00) -0.000 (0.00)
Smoker -0.146 (0.11) 0.056 (0.06) -0.284*** (0.05) -0.136*** (0.03)
Risk attitude health 0.002 (0.02) -0.029** (0.01) -0.226*** (0.03) -0.159*** (0.02)
Worries Health -0.252*** (0.07) -0.066 (0.04) -0.004 (0.01) -0.001 (0.01)
Female 0.743*** (0.15) 0.176** (0.07) 0.330*** (0.06) -0.045 (0.03)
Age -0.079** (0.03) 0.001 (0.01) -0.026 (0.01) 0.002 (0.01)
Age squared 0.001** (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) 0.000* (0.00) -0.000 (0.00)
Foreign 0.078 (0.25) -1.160*** (0.20) 0.142 (0.10) 0.119 (0.07)
Married 0.215 (0.12) -0.105 (0.06) 0.047 (0.05) 0.041 (0.03)
Children under 16 -0.001 (0.12) 0.063 (0.07) -0.071 (0.05) -0.072* (0.03)
West Germany 0.436* (0.19) 0.389*** (0.08) 0.102 (0.06) 0.073* (0.03)
Full-time employed -0.325 (0.17) -0.111 (0.08) -0.001 (0.07) 0.024 (0.04)
Self-employed 0.096 (0.18) 0.060 (0.09) -0.145 (0.11) -0.016 (0.06)
Blue collar worker 0.431 (0.28) -0.151 (0.14) -0.073 (0.07) -0.154*** (0.04)
White collar worker 0.123 (0.21) -0.099 (0.10) 0.059 (0.07) -0.084* (0.04)
Health job 0.155 (0.22) 0.078 (0.13) -0.033 (0.10) 0.039 (0.06)
Net-household inc./1000 0.017 (0.02) 0.011* (0.01) -0.022* (0.01) 0.005 (0.00)
Net-labour inc./1000 -0.019 (0.02) -0.023 (0.01) 0.012 (0.03) -0.081*** (0.02)
Years of schooling -0.011 (0.02) -0.002 (0.01) 0.060*** (0.01) 0.031*** (0.01)
2002 0.080 (0.07) -0.009 (0.04) 0.048 (0.04) 0.104*** (0.02)
2004 -0.046 (0.07) -0.062 (0.04) 0.056 (0.03) -0.003 (0.01)
Constant (Laten class 1) 3.704*** (1.00) 2.657*** (0.47) 2.553*** (0.44) 2.205*** (0.24)
Constant (Laten class 2) 5.056*** ( 1.04) 4.572*** (0.46) 3.777*** (0.44) 4.287*** (0.23)
Constant (Laten class 3) 6.600*** (0.99) 3.348*** (0.46) 6.101*** (0.53) 2.569*** (0.24)
Constant (Laten class 4) 4.973*** (0.96) 2.345*** (0.47) 4.293*** (0.44) 3.255*** (0.23)
Alpha 0.434*** (0.03) 0.328*** (0.01)
Log-pseudolikelihood -16766.063 -77597.446
Akaike 33876.126 156765.660 .
Observations 9619 141345
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The hypothesis of equality of all
parameters across the two stages could be rejected in favor of the hurdle model.
20Table 7: Probabilities of latent class membership - Deductible
π1 π2 π3
coeﬃcient std. error coeﬃcient std. error coeﬃcient std. error
Deductible -0.378 (0.52) -0.162 (0.63) -0.837 (0.43)
Private 0.802 (0.52) 1.267* (0.59) 1.007* (0.42)
PCS -0.138** (0.05) -0.109* (0.05) -0.108** (0.04)
MCS -0.028 (0.03) 0.011 (0.03) -0.009 (0.02)
SAH very good 4.020*** (1.13) 3.739** (1.15) 1.604* (0.79)
SAH good 1.539* (0.69) 2.058** (0.80) 0.612 (0.45)
SAH bad or poor 0.961 (0.86) 1.092 (0.92) 0.451 (0.65)
BMI high 0.347 (0.39) 0.150 (0.47) -0.004 (0.31)
BMI very high 0.931 (0.54) -0.574 (0.69) -0.292 (0.43)
Hospital Stays in t-1 3.358* (1.35) 3.130* (1.37) 3.079* (1.36)
Degree Disability -0.024 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01) -0.014 (0.01)
Smoker 0.684 (0.49) -1.278* (0.62) -0.262 (0.35)
Risk attitude health 0.119 (0.08) 0.212** (0.08) 0.039 (0.06)
Worries health 0.043 (0.41) -0.398 (0.42) -0.429 (0.29)
Female 2.018*** (0.54) 0.624 (0.62) 0.873 (0.49)
Age 0.062 (0.12) 0.096 (0.14) 0.004 (0.11)
Age squared 0.000 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00)
Foreign 0.076 (1.67) 4.072*** (1.11) -1.074 (1.79)
Married 0.982* (0.42) 1.124* (0.53) 0.517 (0.36)
Children under 16 0.103 (0.57) -0.728 (0.54) -0.520 (0.42)
West Germany -0.425 (0.51) -1.422* (0.66) -0.960 (0.53)
Full-time employed 0.603 (0.74) 0.780 (0.80) -0.049 (0.54)
Self-employed -1.155 (0.85) -1.619 (0.93) -1.154 (0.66)
Blue collar worker 2.208 (1.57) 0.470 (1.35) 0.550 (1.20)
White collar worker -1.330 (1.00) -0.509 (0.96) -0.061 (0.71)
Health job 2.720* (1.20) -0.502 (1.47) -0.452 (1.04)
Net household inc./1000 -0.086 (0.11) -0.079 (0.05) -0.077 (0.05)
Net labour inc./1000 -0.122 (0.17) 0.057 (0.09) 0.023 (0.08)
Years of schooling 0.103 (0.06) 0.025 (0.08) 0.187** (0.06)
2002 -0.235 (0.73) 0.705 (0.69) 0.217 (0.57)
2004 -0.215 (0.83) -0.110 (0.81) 0.189 (0.58)
Constant 0.971 (5.49) -0.194 (4.29) 5.065 (3.15)
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Coeﬃcients have to be interpreted relative to the base categrory
21Table 8: Probabilities of latent class membership - Addon
π1 π2 π3
coeﬃcient std. error coeﬃcient std. error coeﬃcient std. error
Addon -0.252 (0.18) 0.312 (0.27) -0.059 (0.28)
PCS -0.008 (0.01) -0.029 (0.02) -0.032* (0.01)
MCS -0.007 (0.01) -0.003 (0.01) -0.017* (0.01)
SAH very good -0.124 (0.26) 1.127** (0.43) -1.584* (0.76)
SAH good 0.060 (0.15) 0.347 (0.28) 0.239 (0.21)
SAH poor or bad -1.050*** (0.20) -1.053** (0.34) -0.659** (0.25)
BMI high -0.081 (0.11) -0.077 (0.18) 0.051 (0.16)
BMI very high -0.114 (0.16) 0.290 (0.20) 0.160 (0.20)
Hospital Stays in t-1 -1.988*** (0.20) 0.073 (0.07) -0.791*** (0.15)
Degree Disability -0.016*** (0.00) 0.008* (0.00) -0.008** (0.00)
Smoker 0.016 (0.12) 0.248 (0.16) -0.623*** (0.18)
Worries health -0.018 (0.10) -0.073 (0.18) -0.576*** (0.14)
Risk attitude health 0.006 (0.03) -0.025 (0.04) 0.003 (0.03)
Female -0.735*** (0.15) -0.012 (0.18) -0.502** (0.17)
Age 0.081** (0.03) -0.022 (0.04) 0.124*** (0.04)
Age squared -0.001* (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) -0.001* (0.00)
Foreign 0.272 (0.27) -0.027 (0.25) 0.513 (0.31)
Married 0.175 (0.13) 0.313 (0.19) 0.271 (0.16)
Children under 16 -0.019 (0.13) 0.198 (0.20) -0.351 (0.23)
West Germany 0.019 (0.15) 0.190 (0.19) -0.813*** (0.17)
Full-time employed 0.303 (0.18) 0.045 (0.28) -0.065 (0.30)
Self-employed 0.341 (0.31) 0.279 (0.49) 0.029 (0.44)
Blue collar worker -0.051 (0.20) 0.089 (0.29) -0.612 (0.33)
White collar worker -0.396* (0.19) -0.267 (0.32) -0.604* (0.30)
Health job 0.971** (0.30) 0.695 (0.51) -0.342 (0.69)
Net household inc./1000 -0.051 (0.04) -0.068 (0.06) 0.102** (0.04)
Net labour inc./1000 -0.136 (0.10) 0.229 (0.13) -0.209 (0.15)
Years of schooling 0.038 (0.03) -0.093* (0.04) 0.101** (0.03)
2002 -0.248 (0.25) -0.562 (0.48) 0.344 (0.39)
2004 0.157 (0.26) -0.393 (0.51) -0.321 (0.40)
Constant -0.631 (1.06) 1.293 (1.51) -1.212 (1.41)
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Coeﬃcients have to be interpreted relative to the base category
22